Linguistics as Semiotics. Saussure and Bühler Revisited. by Durst-Andersen, Per
1 
 
Signs vol. 2: pp. 1-29, 2008 
ISSN: 1902-8822  
Per Durst-Andersen 
Copenhagen Business School, Denmark 
 
Linguistics as Semiotics. Saussure and Bühler Revisited. 
 
Abstract 
The article identifies some fundamental problems with Sausure’s sign 
conception and with Bühler’s Organon Model, and presents two new sign 
and communication models, one for the speaker, the Grammatical 
Triangle, and another for the hearer, the Semiotic Wheel. It is argued that 
the arbitrariness of language makes its arsenal of words omnipotent and 
capable of referring to anything. Exactly because of its arbitrariness 
language must have a code that can give a semiotic direction to the 
otherwise completely static sign. The speaker’s model consists of an 
obligatory choice between three types of code corresponding to the three 
ways in which states of affairs exist: situations in a real or in an imagined 
world, the speaker’s experience or non-experience of them or the hearer’s 
experience or non-experience of them. The hearer uses his model as an 
information seeker in order to compensate for those pieces of content 
that were left out by the speaker’s choice of semiotic orientation. 
 
Keywords: language functions, icon, index, symbol, arbitrariness, indexicality, 
diagrammatic relations, function of grammar or code, speaker model, hearer 
model, types of languages or grammar, situation, experience, information, 




It is more or less common to start a paper by introducing the problem and to 
conclude it by solving the problem. In our case there seems to be a couple of 
problems, but it is difficult to raise them as specific issues, because nobody has 
seen them as problems so far. This applies to Saussure’s theory of the 
arbitrariness of human language from 1916, and to Bühler’s theory of language 
functions and their corresponding sign types as they appear in his revised 
Organon Model in 1934. In the following sections I shall try to identify the 
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2. Saussure revisited 
2.1. Saussure’s conception and its influence 
All have taken it for granted that Saussure was right in saying that the linguistic 
sign is two-sided consisting of a sound-image and a concept, and that the 
relation between what is also known as the expression of the sign, i.e. the 
signifier (signifiant), and the content of it, i.e. the signified (signifié), is arbitrary 
and established by convention (Saussure 1916: 66ff). This has simply been the 
starting point for every general linguistic theory, since Saussure’s Cours de 
linguistique générale saw the light almost three years after his death in 1913. In 
other words, language consists of words or lexemes which are symbols, not 
indexes or icons. Although Saussure devotes the second part (pp. 141-192) to 
grammar, the specific semiotic status of grammatical morphemes, so-called 
grammemes (e.g., a, the, and –ed in English), is not touched and the specific 
role of grammar in the semiosis process is not mentioned. We are told that 
lexemes are free, while grammemes are bound, but, nevertheless, he seems to 
have difficulty in accepting a clear distinction between lexicon and grammar (p. 
186f). He stresses that the same content can be expressed by grammatical 
means as well as by lexical means, i.e. words, and holds the view that some 
languages are more lexical (e.g., Chinese), whereas others are more 
grammatical (e.g., German).  
All other linguistic traditions or schools also regard words as 
symbols, and they also have nothing to say about the semiotic status of 
grammatical entities and their specific role in semiosis. This concerns the 
various varieties of old structuralism such as the Prager School (cf. Jakobson 
1971), the Copenhagen School (cf. Hjelmslev 1943), the Russian tradition (cf. 
Serebrennikov 1973), the Tartu School (cf. Lucid 1977) and the American 
structuralist tradition from Bloomfield (1935) to Hockett (1958). It also concerns 
the different varieties of neostructuralism such as Transformational Grammar 
(Chomsky 1957) and its various offshoots in the sixties (e.g., Generative 
Semantics) and seventies (e.g., Space Grammar), Government and Binding 
and other formal grammars (cf. Chomsky 1981 and 1986), Functional Grammar 
(cf. Givón 1981, Dik 1989 and Hengeveldt 2004) and Cognitive Grammar (cf. 
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Langacker 1999, Lakoff 1987 and Talmy 2001). The difference between them is 
that the old structuralist tradition paid a lot of attention to the phonological and 
morphological levels of language, while the new structuralist tradition lost that 
interest, at least when we are speaking of synchronic studies, and instead 
concentrated their attention on syntax alone or its relations to semantics. The 
interest went from the simple sign to the complex sign without discussing the 
semiotic consequences of doing so. 
 
2.2. Stating the problem 
The consequence of taking the Saussurian sign conception for granted is 
predictable: nobody ever questioned it. Jakobson (1962, 1963 and 1965) 
critisized Saussure for considering language an arbitrary system, but all his 
examples of indexicality and iconicity are taken from grammar itself, whereby he 
never really cracked the problem –  in doing so he actually avoided it: For what 
reason are words arbitrary? What is the function of having an arsenal of pure 
symbols? Nobody ever asked these crucial questions. This concerns Jakobson, 
too, despite the fact that he advocated a teleological approach to language and 
struggled all his life to develop a means-end model for language (cf. Jakobson 
1963). Jakobson was attracted to Peirce and he did not miss an opportunity to 
mention Peirce – especially when he was critisizing Saussure (cf. above). But 
he never used Peirce in his own research. This is perhaps linked to Peirce’s 
thrichotomic way of thinking (e.g., representamen – object – interpretant) which 
must have been difficult for Jakobson to accommodate to his own dichotomic 
way of thinking (e.g., expression – content), although there need not be any 
inconsistency in applying them in combination: dichotomies may apply to 
performing an analysis or a deconstruction of a mental building, while 
trichotomies may apply to performing a synthesis or a construction of a mental 
building. 
 
2.3. Discussing the function of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign 
We shall keep to the sharp distinction between the lexicon of a language 
consisting of lexemes which constitute an open class or an additive system and 
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its grammar consisting of grammemes which constitute a closed class or a 
structured system. Let us start by looking at the lexicon as an abstract entity. In 
principle, it contains names for three different things: 1) names for objects in the 
form of nouns; 2) names for situations in the form of verbs; and 3) names for 
qualities in the form of adjectives. Without grammar no lexeme would be able to 
point out of itself – the common name book will create an image, but certainly 
not a specific picture of a particular book, and simultaneously an idea, but 
certainly not concrete thoughts about a certain book. The abstract capacity of 
book makes it possible to refer to any book in the past, present and future, be it 
in a real world or in an imagined world. I call it the omnipotence of the word. All 
lexemes have this capacity simply because they are symbols where there is an 
arbitrary relationship between expression and content, be it the image-based 
content or the idea-based content which is mediated by the expression unit (cf. 
just above). 
The word morning applies to any morning in the past, present and 
the future – there are no limitations at all. In the same way, Morning! can be 
used as a greeting every morning and among all people in an English-speaking 
community. If we look at the corresponding non-verbal greetings such as 
kissing, embracing, hand shaking, knocking with one’s head and waving with 
one’s hand (all functioning as so-called emblems or intentional gestures, cf. 
Kendon 1995 and McNeill 1992), none of them would possess the same 
universal character or omnipotence as the verbal greeting, because – and this 
is crucial – they all inherently contain indexical and iconic elements. 
When produced in a non-verbal greeting situation all the symbol-
like gestures can be said to involve two types of contents (cf. Jensen 1999). 
First, they all involve “I hereby show you my respect” – this is shown by the 
gesture itself and its direction. Secondly, they all involve “We hereby reconfirm 
our mutual relationship” which is the effect of the addressee’s reaction to the 
sender’s message, i.e. the effect of a successful communication. The point is, 
however, that although I can say Morning! to my wife, to my dear friend, to my 
colleague, to a person I pass everyday in the subway and to a total stranger 
whom I see for the first time in the front of my office, I cannot use any of the 
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non-verbal greetings in all the above-mentioned situations. I cannot – or should 
I say: I will not – give a good-morning kiss to a person who is a complete 
stranger, or a good-morning knock with my head to my wife, or give a good-
morning hand shake to the person I pass every day in the subway. 
Each of the non-verbal greetings is limited in use, and they are so 
because as signs they are non-arbitrary: there is a diagrammatic, i.e. an iconic 
relationship between the signifier and the signified. The physical distance 
between the sender and the addressee reflects the intimeness or the depth of 
the mutual relationship between the sender and the addressee. This means that 
if their relationship is intimate or deep, they will, if possible, use a gesture with 
no distance; if their relationship is non-intimate or non-deep, they will use a 
gesture with some distance. The point is that because of that none of the 
gestures can fulfill the universal function of the verbal greeting. The fact that 
they involve iconic elements make them speak with a concrete voice, and the 
fact that they are indexical make them goal-directed and dynamic. In the case of 
gestures functioning as symbols it is not possible to separate the code from the 
actual signs used. The code is an inherent part of the signs themselves, 
because the signs are not only symbolic, but inherently indexical and iconic. 
And this is more or less true of all non-verbal communication systems. 
 
2.4. Concluding and sharpening the problem 
The arbitrariness of the linguistic sign is therefore a must for a communication 
tool that should be used globally. According to Martinet (1949) language 
consists of two articulations. The first articulation system is made up of 
morphemes or sememes, minimal signs, which together form words that can be 
combined into sentences. The second articulation system is made up of 
expression units, i.e. phonemes, that do not in themselves mean anything, but 
whose function is to distinguish one sign from any other sign. According to 
Martinet it is exactly the presence of the second articulation system that makes 
the linguistic sign arbitrary and, moreover, guarantees the economy of 
language. The point is, however, that an arbitrary sign, i.e. a symbol, is purely 
static in itself and therefore completely helpless in a communication situation 
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that is dynamic per se. A symbol needs a vehicle, i.e. a code, that can bring it to 
the proper place. I shall return to this important issue below. 
 
3. Bühler revisited 
3.1. Introducing Bühler’s Organon Model 
Just as it was the case with Saussure’s conception, nobody has seen a problem 
with Bühler’s Organon Model. It was published in 1934 in his famous book 
Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache, but it was developed 
already in 1918 (cf. Bühler 1934: 28). In the Organon Model Bühler regards 
language as a means of  communication which demands at least three 
components or participants that together form an equilateral triangle: speaker, 
hearer and objects and states of affairs (“Gegenstände und Sachverhalte”). 
Language establishes a function with each of the three obligatory 
communication participants: the expressive function is related to the speaker, 
the appeal function to the hearer, and the representative function to objects and 





Fig.  1: Bühler’s Organon Model 
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laid the very foundation of pragmatics in general and speech act theory in 
particular (1934: pp. 30ff). Searle’s distinction between expressives, 
commissives and declarations was unthinkable without the influence of his 
teacher Austin (1962), but it was also in direct continuation of Bühler’s three 
distinctions, viz. language in relation to the speaker, its relation to the hearer, 
and its relation to reality (cf. Searle 1969). In that way it can be argued that the 
model has been an enormous inspiration and a guiding line for several 
generations of scholars, although, admittedly, not all may be aware of it. 
 
3.2. Discussing Bühler’s language functions 
According to Bühler, the representative function is by far the most dominating 
function of language (p. 30), although each function is present in any utterance 
and therefore is part of the linguistic form, i.e. langue, and not its substance, i.e. 
parole (cf. Hjelmselv 1943): when a speaker utters That horse is beautiful, the 
utterance does not only represent a certain state of affairs or a certain situation, 
but it also expresses the speaker’s emotions and at the same time serves as an 
appeal to the hearer to give a response. This is exactly what distinguishes 
Bühler’s three language functions from Jakobson’s six functions (cf. Jakobson 
1960) and Halliday’s seven (cf. Halliday (1975). Bühler’s three functions are 
present in any utterance, whereas, for instance, Jakobson’s poetic function may 
be present or may not be present (cf. Jakobson 1960). Bühler’s functions are 
language functions, Jakobson’s and Halliday’s are speech functions. 
Although all this sounds reasonable and convincing, a problem 
arises, when we read Bühler carefully. While his expressive function and appeal 
function only make sense when language is used in communication, his 
representative function (in German Darstellungsfunktion, jf the subtitle of his 
monograph) seems to be used in two very different ways corresponding to his 
two terms objects and states of affairs (1934: 30). Language represents objects, 
but it also represents states of affairs, i.e. situations. There is, however, a big 
difference between these two kinds of representations. When language 
represents objects, it need not do it in communication – quite on the contrary. 
This function is in principle purely static and therefore has a place outside 
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communication. It is reflected in dictionaries in the form of lexemes or words 
which make up the lexicon of a language. This is the static meaning of the 
terms “representation” and “Darstellung”. When language represents states of 
affairs, i.e. situations in a real world or in an imagined world, we are not dealing 
with words, i.e. symbols, but with utterances or complex signs in Bühler’s 
terminology (corresponding to supersigns in Eco’s terminology (cf. Eco 1975). 
In short, we are dealing with language in use, with written or spoken discourse 
that is a dynamic phenomenon, and not a static one. This constitutes the 
dynamic meaning of the terms “representation” and “Darstellung”. This duality is 
not found in the two other language functions, only in the representative 
function. And it is not a coincidence: Bühler explicitly states (1934: 30) that 
language is a two class system of representation means, one for words, i.e. the 
lexicon of a language, and another for sentence building, i.e. syntax (see also 
pp. 69-78 where he elaborates on the distinction between words and 
sentences). According to Bühler both systems perform a representative 
function, and it is exactly the double nature of the representative function that 
makes it the dominant function of language and distinguishes it from the other 
two functions. He says at the same place (1934: 30): “… in order to get it right 
at the place in the figure [from p. 25] where “Things [Dinge]” stands we now 
write the double designation “Objects and States of Affairs” [Gegenstände und 
Sachverhalte]“. It looks as if Bühler was trapped by the German language which 
has one “dynamic” word, i.e. Darstellung, for two different functions, the one 
being static and the other being dynamic. The same linguistic trap is found in 
the English language, where the “static” word representation is used for both 
functions.  
I conclude the discussion by saying that in order to make sense out 
of Bühler’s Organon Model we must remove the word and its naming function 
from the model. This leaves us with the representative function used 
unambiguously and in line with the expressive function and the appeal function. 
All three functions are only present in communication and they are present due 
to the implementation of grammar. Words are symbols – they are static and 
cannot by themselves take part in communication. We saw it in connection with 
 
Signs vol. 2: pp 1-29, 2008 
ISSN 1902-8822 
9
Morning! where the intonation revealed that it was intended as a greeting and 
not as a name for a particular part of the day. 
 
3.3. Discussing Bühler’s sign types 
Bühler’s Organon Model (see fig. 1) also comprises within itself a semiotic 
elaboration of his language functions. According to him, any linguistic sign, i.e. a 
word, or any complex linguistic sign, i.e. an utterance, is “a symbol in virtue of 
its assignment to objects and states of affairs, a symptom (evidence, indication) 
due to its dependence upon the speaker whose innerness it expresses, and 
signal because of its appeal to the hearer whose external and internal behavour 
it governs just like other communicative signs” (1934: 28). In that way the three 
language functions become explicitly linked to three different sign types. 
Interestingly enough, nobody ever questioned the semiotic triad, presumably 
because each of the three sign types makes sense if one pairs them with their 
respective language function and ignores the duality of the representative 
function. The problem arises when we look at the triad itself, i.e. symbols, 
symptoms and signals. Symptoms and signals are clearly indexes. A symptom 
points backwards to the speaker and therefore we also go back in time, i.e. 
back to an earlier experience. A signal points to the hearer and therefore points 
forward in time. A symbol does not point, but names. There is no motion or 
direction involved, at all. 
Again we suspect that the mismatch is due to Bühler’s lack of 
distinction between words as static elements and utterances as dynamic 
elements. It makes sense to claim that words are symbols of objects. But it 
does not make sense to say that a specific utterance is a symbol of a certain 
state of affairs or a certain situation. If all utterances were complex symbols 
consisting of simple symbols, it follows that we had to distinguish between two 
sets of symbols, i.e. static and dynamic ones. It also follows that there would be 
an arbitrary relationship established by convention between every single 
sentence and every single situation. This would mean that all persons would 
have to learn all utterances by heart in order to understand what they symbolize 
and in order to produce them later on – just as they learnt all words by heart in 
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order to understand the meaning of them and later to be able to reproduce them 
in utterances. This totally contradicts common sense and completely 
undermines what is normally referred to as the productivity of language: due to 
its grammar language can give expression to any old and any new thought, and 
they can all be understood by the hearer, if he or she masters the language in 
question (see, for instance, Hockett 1963, Jakobson 1968 and Lyons 1977: 76). 
In short, words are symbols, but sentences cannot be. They must 
function as a sort of an index, i.e. perform a pointing function which makes them 
dynamic and goal-directed at the same time. The consequence is that we have 
to remove symbol from Bühler’s triad and instead look for a lacking index. We 
are looking for a concept for the sign of that part of reality that was stimulus to 
the speaker’s experience, of which the sign is also symptom and to which the 
hearer returns when he has mentally processed the effect of the same sign 
understood as a signal. In other words: we are looking for a sign that points to 
the situation that is stimulus to the speaker’s experience and at which the 
hearer arrives after having decoded the utterance. I shall call the lacking index 
model, and define it as the semiotic sign correlate to the representative function 
of language: an utterance is a model, because it points to a situation. 
This means that we get the following indexical triad: model, 
symptom and signal. The triad corresponds to another triad, viz. situation, the 
speaker’s experience of that situation, and information to the hearer. The order 
is not random: a piece of information to the hearer presupposes an experience 
by the speaker, and an experience presupposes a situation. Without a situation, 
no experience, and without experience, no information. In the same way, model, 
symptom and signal constitute a certain order within the realm of indexicality: to 
use Peirce’s terminology, model is firstness, symptom is secondness, and 
signal is thirdness. In other words, within indexes model occupies the first order, 
symptom the second order and signal the third order. Indexes themselves 





Signs vol. 2: pp 1-29, 2008 
ISSN 1902-8822 
11
3.4. Concluding  
If what has been stated so far is true, we can say that Bühler’s Organon Model 
with the three language functions is a decoding model for the hearer. It explains 
why the hearer has to interpret any utterance in three different ways in order to 
draw all pieces of information out of an utterance. An utterance will always 
represent a certain situation, express the speaker’s experience of it and appeal 
the hearer to find out the information status of the utterance alone as well as of 
its parts and through mental models get access to the specific situation referred 
to. In other words, the Organon Model is the hearer’s model, where we are 
dealing with both-and, not with either-or: any utterance in any language will 
serve for the hearer as a model of a situation, as a symptom of the speaker’s 
experience of the situation, and as a signal to find a matching experience and a 
matching situation to it. Since all people know it, they must know it not only in 
their capacity as hearers, but also in their capacity as speakers. Therefore the 
natural question arises: which sign and communication model functions as the 
point of departure for the speaker? Which model will guide the speaker, when 
he gets an intention and wants to verbalize his intention? We are talking about 
an encoding model, where we have to deal with the question “What is the 
function of grammar in communication?” or “For what reason does language 
need a code”. Bühler did not ask questions of this type. We know that the main 
function of language is to serve as a communication tool between human 
beings and that it fits its main function and all subfunctions derived from it. But 
nobody addressed this question to the code or grammar itself. And nobody ever 
considered its function in a communication situation. 
 
4. The speaker’s model – introducing the Grammatical Triangle 
The answer to the question “What is the function of grammar in 
communication?” is quite simple: due to the fact that all lexical units of a 
language have an arbitrary and completely conventional relation between the 
signifier and the signified, language must have a code, normally called a 
grammar when dealing with language, that can instruct the hearer how the 
content should be understood. The omnipotence of each single symbol, which 
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is ensured by its arbitrariness, would be empty without a grammar or a code, 
because grammar or the code is the tool or vehicle that carries the name to the 
rigth place. Exactly because of its arbitrariness language must have a code, i.e. 
a grammar, that can give a semiotic direction to the otherwise completely static 
sign or a voice to the otherwise completely mute sign. The fact that lexemes are 
symbols and thus arbitrary, yield them no semiotic direction at all. They are all 
static, and the staticness is their big advantage and at the same time their 
weakness. Their staticness makes them prepared for any kind of job, but at the 
same time they are totally dependent on a vehicle in order to get a specific job 
done. If there is any direction at all in a symbol, it is inner reference and not 
outer reference: a name will just refer to its own place in the linguistic system 
and at the same time create a combined percept-concept (object-interpretant) in 
the mind of a human being. Symbols in themselves do not refer, they just name. 
In order for a noun, or a verb, or an adjective to get access to a specific object, 
or a specific situation with specific participants, or a specific quality they must 
be supplied with a device that draws the hearer’s attention to what the speaker 
intended – and this is exactly what grammar (or any other indexical device) 
does. Another way of putting it is to say that morning be good (or in any other 
order) gives only a vague impression of what really is at stake – it has a 
referential potential, nothing else. In order for the speaker and the hearer to get 
access to a specific real or imagined world one has to use grammemes for 
situation type, time world and ontological status of the world referred to. 
Grammar in itself functions as a prime index that makes symbols 
dynamic by giving them a semiotic direction. Due to the fact that a direction 
always contains a target, grammar can also be said to provide the symbols with 
a specific frame of reference. But unlike decoding which is a search in all 
possible directions, encoding involves an obligatory choice between three 
possible targets of direction. Why? Because all communication requires three 
participants, viz. reality, speaker and hearer. One has to consider that, in fact, 
state of affairs has three modalities of existence: the situation as such, the 
situation as it is experienced or not experienced by the speaker and the 
situation as it is experienced or not experienced by the hearer (see also Durst-
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Andersen 1992 for a cognitive explanation of this three-way ambiguity). This 
means that one may refer to the situation itself, to the speaker’s experience of it 
or to the information intended for the hearer which is the linguistic result of the 
speaker’s comparison of his own experience with the hearer’s – if they match, it 
is old information, if they do not, it is new information. Language must make a 
choice in order not to complicate matters for the speaker in his encoding 
process and not to confuse the hearer in his decoding process. The encoding 
and decoding processes would be extremely difficult, if those parts that make 
up a grammar were completely disharmonic by pointing in all possible 
directions. We are thus dealing with an either-or relation in the case of encoding 
(see fig. 2). 
.  
 
Fig. 2: The Speaker’s Model – The Grammatical Triangle 
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The speaker knows the potential three-way ambiguity of any symbol and in 
order to be able to provide the hearer with an unambiguous tool that can 
instruct him how the string of words should be understood, he must choose 
between the three types of indexes, viz. model, symptom and signal (cf. Durst-
Andersen 2005b). This means that all languages have a set of symbols, i.e. a 
lexicon, but must choose between three types of indexes, i.e. between three 
grammatical supertypes, the function of which is to be able to bring the symbols 
to their target by giving them a semiotic direction, i.e. by pointing to situations in 
reality, to the speaker or to the hearer. When the semiotic direction has been 
determined by the choice of grammatical orientation, the speaker has another 
choice to make, namely whether the target being pointed at is hit or not: (1) Is 
the object present or absent in the situation referred to? (2) Is the object part of 
the speaker’s experiences or is it not? (3) Is the object part of the hearer’s 
experiences or is it not? This choice is fundamentally based on iconicity: (1) 
Does the copy named by the noun have an original in the situation referred to?; 
(2) Does the original in the situation referred to have a copy in the speaker’s 
store of experiences?; (3) Does the speaker’s copy in his store of experiences 
have an equivalent in the hearer’s store of experiences? The result will be a 
choice of a specific grammeme in the three languages in question (for further 
details, see below). All this explains why Jakobson found iconic relations within 
the grammatical systems of various languages (cf. Jakobson 1962, 1963 and 
1965). 
 
5. The three types of grammatical orientation 
Since Chomsky’s Syntactic structures appeared in 1957, linguists have believed 
in Universal Grammar and have tried to find linguistic expressions for what is 
considered to be universal content. One has ignored empirical facts about 
languages, namely that some languages, for instance, Russian and Danish, 
have nothing in common apart from having words and sentences, whereas 
others have a lot, but not all in common, for instance, English and Danish. The 
differences and similarities in content appear as differences or similarities in 
expression. But because language is considered to be arbitrary, nobody has 
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paid attention to differences in expression. Saussure has been read literally: if 
language as such is founded on the principle of arbitrariness, then any 
language may express a certain piece of content in any possible way, lexically 
or grammatically, by prefixes, infixes or by suffixes. This line of argument holds 
in the case of Martinet’s secondary articulation system, but it does not hold in 
the case of his primary articulation system. 
By arguing that the grammar of a certain language is a big index 
with iconic relations the expression units of a certain language get a new and 
important role. It is now possible to answer the question ”Why do languages 
differ with respect to expression units?” in a natural and direct way – They differ 
because languages differ with respect to content. The only way in which 
languages can show differences in content is by having different structures of 
expression. They seem to fall into three types, which divide themselves into 
specific subtypes corresponding to specific systems of languages (for an earlier 
version of this theory, called the theory of linguistic supertypes, see Durst-
Andersen 1992: 102-105; for the latest version, see Durst-Andersen 2005a and 
2005b). 
Some languages have a code that functions as a model of 
situations in reality. These languages have specific verbal and nominal 
categories that distinguish them from other types. They have the verbal 
category of aspect to distinguish events (a state caused by an activity) from 
processes (an activity intending to cause a state), the indicative and the 
subjunctive mood to distinguish real world from imagined world, and direct and 
oblique cases to distinguish referential and non-referential uses. Moreover, they 
have many sentences which lack a subject – following the implicit rule: if there 
is no figure in a picture, there can be no subject. In that way It is raining with a 
formal subject is just Is raining in that type of languages, i.e. a subjectless 
sentence, It is cold is just Cold, etc. Grammars of that type are called reality-
oriented grammars, and they are found in languages such as Russian, Hindi 
and Chinese.  
Other languages have a code that functions as a symptom of the 
speaker’s experience of situations. These languages do also have aspect, 
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because both events and processes can be experienced, but besides that they 
have a well-developed modal system within the indicative mood. The function of 
the indicative submodal system is to tell the hearer whether the speaker saw or 
did not see the situation referred to, and if he or she saw it, which parts he or 
she actually saw: the activity, the state, or both the activity and the state of an 
event (a state caused by an activity). Grammars of that type are named 
speaker-oriented grammars, and they are found in languages such as 
Bulgarian, Turkish and Georgian (all languages spoken in the Balkan area are 
speaker-oriented with certain characteristic features, e.g., all of them lack an 
infinitive form: it has no place in the system, because it does not denote a 
situation that can be experienced by the human eye – the infinitive form denotes 
potentiality per se and is linked to an imagined world). 
A different category or supertype of languages are those which 
have a code that functions as a signal to the hearer to make sense out of what 
often seems to be nonsense. Consider, for instance, the utterance Bush and 
Blair stayed in Iraq and the violence got worse. If it is translated literally into 
Russian, it cannot but mean that Bush and Blair actually were in Iraq 
(presumably because of the warm weather) and that the violence got worse 
totally independent of their being there. In English Bush and Blair are used as 
metonomies for the American and the English troops, respectively – what 
English-speaking people know, because the code acts as a signal to the hearer 
to find the situations behind the message. Such languages have a sharp 
distinction within the category of tense between the present perfect (e.g., has 
said) and the simple past (e.g., said) in order to distinguish new from old pieces 
of information and a sharp distinction between the definite article (e.g., the 
director) and the indefinite article (e.g., a director) in order to differentiate 
familiarity from non-familiarity – all being hearer-based notions. Moreover, they 
have so-called it- and there-sentences, because they treat sentences as logical 
propositions with an obligatory logical subject and a logical predicate. 
Grammars of that type are called hearer-oriented, and they are found in 
languages such as English, Danish and Swedish. The above-mentioned verbal 
and nominal categories are not found in Russian, Hindi and Chinese, and 
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indeed could not be found, because these languages do not speak with the 
hearer’s voice, but with the voice of reality – that is why they automatically place 
Bush and Blair in a certain situation in Iraq (for more information, see Durst-
Andersen 2005b). 
If a language speaks with the voice of reality, it will have situation 
as its basic unit. The speaker will be a third person oriented speaker – from a 
grammatical point of view the speaker acts as a reporter, i.e. speaks with an 
objective voice. If a language speaks with the speaker’s voice, it will have 
experience as its basic unit. The speaker will be a first person oriented speaker 
– from a grammatical point of view the speaker acts as a commentator, i.e. 
speaks with a subjective voice. If a language speaks with the hearer’s voice, it 
will have information as its basic unit. The speaker will be a second person 
oriented speaker – from a grammatical point of view the speaker acts as an 
informer, i.e. speaks with an intersubjective voice. 
All this should appear from the following table, where I also include 
what I call identification mark. Every so-called supertype has a determinant 
category, be it aspect, mood or tense, but it turns out that a determinant 
category tends to expand by conquering territory from other categories, thus 
taking over functions from other verbal categories. The result is that Russian 
has aspectual forms everywhere in the system, that Bulgarian is filled up with 
modal forms and that Danish has only tense forms (cf. Durst-Andersen 2005a). 
Note that Bhat 1999 contains convincing quantitative evidence for the 
expansion hypothesis – he based himself on the overwhelming amount of 
languages spoken in India. 
 
 Reality-oriented Speaker-oriented Hearer-oriented 
Representatives Russian & Chinese Bulgarian & Turkish English & Danish 
Basic Unit Situation Experience Information 
Speaker Orientation Third person First person Second person 
Speaker Function Reporter Commentator Informer 
Identification Mark Aspect Prominence Mood Prominence Tense Prominence 
 
It goes without saying that the effect of having different speaker voices is 
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paramount – not only when we are dealing with communication within the same 
speech community, but also when we are talking about so-called intercultural 
communication. I shall attempt to demonstrate the big differences on the basis 
of a single lexeme made goal-directed by means of three different types of 
grammars. Although I hesitate to use this example – one-word communication 
is abnormal – I have chosen to use it, anyway, for illustrative reasons. 
 
6. The three speaker voices in practise 
Let us take the lexeme for “book” in three different languages and let us attach 
a grammeme to each lexical unit in order to make the linguistic symbol dynamic 
and goal-directed.  
Knig-a (‘book-nominative case’ in Russian), kniga-ta (‘book-article’ 
in Bulgarian) and the book (‘definite article-book’ in English) all have exactly the 
same linguistic content, i.e. they all three evoke the same image (corresponding 
to Peirce’s immediate object) and the same idea (corresponding to Peirce’s 
immediate idea), i.e. all three lexical expression units mediate exactly the same 
two types of content. However, the Russian code, the Bulgarian code and the 
English code make them point to three different things (see fig. 3). Russian 
kniga points to a specific book situated at a certain place in a certain situation; 
Bulgarian knigata points to a specific book in the speaker’s mind; and English 
the book points to a specific book in the hearer’s mind. 
If we substitute the Russian nominative case (i.e. kniga) for the 
genitive knigi, i.e. its semantic opposition, the specific book is automatically 
removed from a concrete place in a certain situation. If there is no local 
reference, you will have to use the genitive in Russian – you could never use 
the nominative or the accusative, i.e. so-called direct cases. Therefore “The 
book is not here” will be Knigi (Genitive) net (Negation) – the genitive noun will 
denote a specific book in the speaker’s and in the hearer’s memory, but the 
Russian noun is not triggered by that. It is triggered by the fact that the model 
that has no local reference at the moment of speech. The nominative is simply 
not possible, because it asserts local reference. If we substitute the so-called 
definite article in Bulgarian (i.e. knigata) for the zero-article, i.e. kniga – its 
 
Signs vol. 2: pp 1-29, 2008 
ISSN 1902-8822 
19
semantic opposition, the specific book is automatically removed from the 
speaker’s mind and is no longer treated as being a part of his or her 
experiences, but is just a book in a situation in reality. If we substitute the 
definite particle in English (i.e. the book) for the indefinite article, i.e. a book – its 
semantic opposition, the specific book in the hearer’s mind is removed and what 





Figure 3: The effect of the three speaker voices 
 
 
The effect of the Russian, Bulgarian and English grammemes should be 
obvious, but add to this that all other grammemes of these languages are in 
harmony, i.e. they speak with the same voice. In other words, the Russian case 
system is designed to be in harmony with the aspectual system that 
distinguishes two complex situations, viz. events (a state caused by an activity) 
and processes (an activity intending to cause a state); the Bulgarian article 
system fits the submodal distinction between situations experienced by the 
 
Signs vol. 2: pp 1-29, 2008 
ISSN 1902-8822 
20
speaker and situations not experienced by the speaker; and the English article 
system correlates with the temporal distinction between news-flashes and flash-
backs, i.e. information that the hearer does not share with the speaker and 
information that he shares with him. 
What we observe here is extremely important from a Peircean way 
of thinking (cf. Peirce 1932). Just as an experience of a certain book understood 
as a physical thing, not as its contents, requires its local existence, the memory 
of it requires an experience of it. This means that we can establish the following 
natural order outside a communication situation, i.e. a purely logical order: 
physical existence (firstness) > somebody’s experience of it (secondness) > 
somebody’s memory of the experience of it (thirdness). Having done this, we 
can establish the same elements within a communication situation with three 
obligatory participants: a situation where a certain object is present (firstness) > 
the speaker’s experience of this object (secondness) > the speaker’s memory of 
this object correlated with the hearer’s memory which yields information 
(thirdness). 
Note that because Peirce was an idealist – he considered 
potentiality to be firstness. I do not hesitate to say that physical existence of a 
certain object is firstness. What is actual is found in pictures being received by 
concrete human beings, as well as in thoughts evoked in human beings by 
receiving pictures. My Pictures and thoughts seem to correspond to Peirce’s 
dynamical objects and dynamical interpretants (cf. Peirce 1953). What is 
potential is found in images, i.e. prototypicalized pictures, created by human 
beings, as well as in ideas, i.e. prototypicalized thougths, being evoked by 
human beings (corresponding to Peirce’s immediate object and immediate 
interpretant, cf. Peirce 1953). They are potential, and because of that any 
lexeme, i.e. any linguistic symbol, will be linked to potentiality. A lexeme just 
names, i.e. it creates an image-idea pair, or (immediate) object and (immediate) 
interpretant in Peirce’s terminology. 
 
7. The hearer’s model revised – introducing the Semiotic Wheel 
When a Russian speaker utters an utterance with kniga (e.g., Ivan (nominative) 
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pročital (perfective) knigu (accusative) ‘Ivan read/has read/had read a/the 
book’), the hearer has no difficulty in locating a specific “book” in a concrete 
situation, because the Russian grammar functions as a model of situations. But 
the Russian hearer will not know from hearing the utterance whether the “book” 
is experienced or not by the speaker, and he will not know whether the speaker 
is talking about the “book” he mentioned yesterday or another “book” that he is 
mentioning for the first time. In other words, the Russian language helps the 
hearer to find the real situation in reality, but leaves him on his own with respect 
to the speaker’s experience and the hearer’s information. Because of that it is 
my hypothesis that the Russian hearer will concentrate his attention on the 
lacking pieces of information in the utterance. 
He knows that any utterance in any language involves a model of a 
situation in a real world or in an imagined world, a symptom of the speaker’s 
experience of that situation and a signal to the hearer to find a match in his 
memeory and via mental models get access to the situation itself. This was, I 
think, what Bühler wanted to say by his Organon Model, but although we 
revised it by removing objects and symbol, we did not succeed in changing its 
purely static look at the expense of a dynamic one. In order to do so we have to 
transform the triangle into a wheel (see fig. 4). 
The Semiotic Wheel is constructed in such a way that the hearer 
must take a full tour of the semiotic wheel irrespective of the place on which he 
or she lands. The Russian hearer lands on Situations after having decoded the 
explicit parts of the utterance and has to make the rest of the tour on his own, 
i.e. via Experiences and via Informations back to Situations where he started. 
 




Fig. 4: The hearer’s model – the Semiotic Wheel 
 
When a Bulgarian hearer is confronted with Stojan e pročel (the perfect form of 
the perfective aspect) knigata (definite article) ‘Stojan has read/must have read 
the book’, he lands on Experiences after having decoded the explicit parts of 
the utterance and has to make the rest of the tour on his own, i.e. via 
Informations and via Situations back to Experiences, but now in a completely 
other position, because he has drawn all possible pieces of information out of 
the utterance in question. The Bulgarian grammar explicitly informed him about 
the speaker’s experience of a certain situation, namely that Stojan knows the 
content of the book in question and therefore must have read it. In other words, 
the speaker informs the hearer that he commits himself to the truth of the entire 
propositional content, although he only experienced q, the state, and not p, the 
activity. But the hearer does not know the information status of the utterance 
and its parts as well as the specific roles carried out by the participants of the 
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situation referred to, for instance, which activity Stojan actually produced – did 
he read the book or did he listen to a tape of the book? Or was he told about the 
book by a friend? These things are totally left out by the Bulgarian grammar and 
it is therefore to the hearer to find out. The same applies to an English hearer 
when he is confronted with the utterance John has read (present perfect) the 
book (definite article). He lands on Informations and therefore has to localize 
the specific book in his mind before he can try to identify its local existence in 
reality. It is also to the hearer to find out whether the speaker actually saw or did 
not see John reading the book. This is so because unlike a Bulgarian utterance 
the English one does not explicate information of that type. Therefore the 
English hearer has to take the rest of the tour on his own, from Informations via 
Situations and via Experiences back to Informations in order to make the final 
interpretation of the utterance, where the different parts are put together. 
Let us return to the utterance Bush and Blair stayed in Iraq and the 
violence got worse. Because English is a hearer-oriented language the speaker 
transformed his knowledge into  information bites. The utterance in itself gives 
the hearer only a vague feeling of what is really at stake. Taken as a model of a 
situation it could only mean that Bush and Blair actually stayed in Iraq. Taken as 
a symptom of the speaker’s experience it could only mean that the speaker 
actually saw Bush and Blair in Iraq. But taken as a signal to the hearer to find 
the situations behind the message it is multiambiguous, if – and this is crucial – 
it had not been the case that the hearer knows who Bush and Blair are and is 
fully aware of the situation in Iraq. This was anticipated by the speaker. By 
combining old information with new information the hearer concludes that the 
American and British troops in Iraq were ordered to remain there by their 
respective leaders, i.e. Bush and Blair, after some hesitation, and as a 
consequence of that decision the violence got worse. The last part of the 
interpretation may be wrong, because the utterance is completely open in that 
respect. Finally, the English hearer will probably conclude that the situations 
included in his interpretation were not witnessed by the speaker – had they 
been witnessed by him, the utterance would not have sounded Bush and Blair 
stayed in Iraq and the violence got worse, but The American and British troops 
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stayed in Iraq and the violence got worse. 
The point is that grammar seems to help the hearer with one thing 
out of three possible ones – the two things that are left out by the grammar are, 
however, compensated for by the hearer himself. This may explain why, 
surprisingly enough, languages change all the time. A thousand years ago Old 
Russian was like Modern Danish, i.e. a hearer-oriented language with simple 
and compound tense forms and with an article distinction, and 700 years ago 
Old Danish was like Modern Russian, i.e. a reality-oriented language with 
aspect, mood and case (all categories are lost). By focusing on the parts that 
are ignored by the grammar of a language, the hearer constantly combine old 
expression units with new content units – tense forms carrying new and old 
information are combined with situations; aspectual forms expressing different 
kinds of situations are linked to the speaker’s experiences or lack of 
experiences; and submodal forms giving witness to the speaker’s experiences 
are associated with new and old information to the hearer. In that way everyday 
communication constantly creates innovations in a speech community. These 
innovations will eventually go together and form a supertype shift in the long run 
(cf. Durst-Andersen 2006).  
 
8. Concluding and summing up 
The article started by pointing to fundamental problems with Sausure’s sign 
conception and with Bühler’s Organon Model which remained unnoticed up till 
now. Saussure (1916) claimed that the relation between the signifier and the 
signified is arbitrary without even trying to ask the question “For what reason?”, 
although the design feature distinguishes human languages from all other 
communication systems. My point was that its arbitrariness makes its arsenal of 
words omnipotent and capable of referring to anything – in opposition to non-
verbal communication systems which are always restricted in use due to the 
indexical and iconic relationship between content and expression. Because of 
its arbitrariness language must possess a code, i.e. a grammar, that can give a 
semiotic direction to the otherwise completely static sign or lend a voice to the 
otherwise entirely mute sign. Without a grammeme the linguistic sign, the 
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lexeme, would be helpless, because it is totally static. Lexemes need a vehicle, 
i.e. a code or a grammar, that as a prime index can give a semiotic direction.  
Bühler taught us about the representative, the expressive and the appeal 
functions of language, but neither he nor anyone else ever asked about the very 
function of the code itself in communication. In his attempt to explain the three 
language functions in semiotic terms Bühler failed to keep important levels apart 
from one another. It was argued on the basis of Peirce (1932) that symptoms 
and signals are both indexes, whereas symbols are not. Furthermore, it was 
argued that unlike the lexeme a sentence does not function as a symbol of a 
certain state of affairs, but as an index of a situation. I removed the wrongly 
placed symbol in Bühler’s triad and replaced it by just another index, and we got 
the indexical triad: model (firstness), symptom (secondness) and signal 
(thirdness). This allowed us to conclude that the grammar of a language turns 
its embedded symbols, i.e. verbs and their subordinated nouns, into (1) models 
of situations in reality, (2) symptoms of the speaker’s experiences or (3) signals 
to the hearer to find the situations behind the messages. In other words, 
because there are three obligatory participants in a communication situation, 
there are three possible targets of semiotic direction: (1) situations in reality, (2) 
the speaker’s experiences of these situations, and (3) information to the hearer. 
Information was defined as the linguistic result of the speaker’s comparison of 
his own memory of the experienced situations with that of the hearer – if there is 
a sign of equality between the speaker’s and the hearer’s memory, the result 
will be old information, if there is not, the result will be new information. Because 
Bühler’s states of affairs have three modalities of existence in a communication 
situation, viz. situations as such, the speaker’s experience of them and the 
hearer’s experience of them, the speakers of a certain language must agree 
what they want to talk about. Therefore they must make an obligatory choice 
between them. This was demonstrated by the so-called Grammatical Triangle, 
i.e. the speaker’s model. Hence, a grammar will be either reality-oriented, 
speaker-oriented or hearer-oriented. This means that many languages differ 
fundamentally from one another – not only with respect to grammatical 
inventory, but certainly also with respect to the way they function in oral and 
 




Whereas the speaker’s model requires an obligatory choice between the 
three modalities, the hearer’s model necessarily involves all three. The hearer 
knows that any utterance in any language involves situations in a real or in an 
imagined world, the speaker’s experience or non-experience of them as well as 
new or old pieces of information to himself. The hearer seems to use his model 
as an information seeker in order to compensate for those pieces of content that 
were left out by the speaker’s choice of semiotic orientation. This was shown in 
the Semiotic Wheel – the revised version of Bühler’s Organon Model made 
dynamical or, to put it differently, made apt for communication.  
The main conclusions of this paper are straigth forward. First, the science 
of linguistics was never driven as a semiotic science. Its growth as a semiotic 
science was not facilitated, but hindered by Saussure’s claim that the linguistic 
sign is arbitrary. People concluded that because the relation between content 
and expression of the sign is arbitrary, its way of expressing it is not significant 
at all. Secondly, communication science was never driven by focusing equally 
on the three participants of a communication situation. It was almost exclusively 
centered on the hearer, whereby the crucial choice of speaker voice was 
ignored. By including the speaker as well we made a serious attempt to reach 
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